Thunder
Run: An Interview with David Zucchino
by John "Spoons"
Sponauer
April 6, 2004
Every war has images that are burned into the public's mind. Operation Iraqi Freedom has several....the blinding sandstorms, or the photos of Iraqis and GIs tearing down statues and paintings of Saddam. The other memorable event of the war for many was the sight of American armor racing into the heart of Baghdad, despite the daily assurances from Iraq's Information Minister that the Allies were nowhere near the city.
The armor was from the US Army's 3rd Infantry Division (Mechanized), and Los Angeles Times reporter David Zucchino was embedded with them for their drive up into Iraq, and then on their daring "Thunder Runs" into the city. A year later, he has released a book about the division's remarkable armor thrusts into Baghdad and the savage fights on a major highway to the west of the city as the division sought to re-supply the armored force. "Thunder Run: The Armored Strike to Capture Baghdad" promises to cement this amazing story into the annals of American military accomplishments with hundreds of first-hand accounts of what happened in the first week of April 2003, so far from Fort Stewart, Georgia.
When did you realize this was a story that you had to record in a book for history?
I realized it at a memorial service in late April 2003 in Baghdad for the soldiers of the 2nd Brigade, 3rd ID, who had been killed in action. I started talking to members of the units, who gave me some pretty amazing accounts of combat during the battle for Baghdad. I had been on the April 7th Thunder Run (with Cyclone Company of Task Force 4-64), ending up at the 14th of July Bridge and, later, the Republican Palace. But I had no idea what was happening elsewhere in the city or along Highway Eight. But after talking to soldiers at the service, I realized that the battle was a lot more intense and extensive than I had realized. When I returned to the U.S. in mid-May, I read back through some of the media coverage from Iraq and realized that virtually nothing had been written about it. No single journalist, myself included, was able to comprehend the full scope of the fight. I started interviewing more soldiers and officers from the Third ID’s Second Brigade, who provided more details of the fighting. At that point, I realized I had a remarkable combat story that had not been told.
The comparisons between “Thunder Run” and “Black Hawk Down” are unavoidable...both are nonfiction war stories written by print journalists, both deal heavily with the ability of the modern US military to fight in urban warfare, and both tell of remarkable battles that the public probably didn’t fully understand at the time. You’re both from Philadelphia, both books were the first of their kind by the authors, and Mark Bowden even wrote the introduction to your book. What influence did “Black Hawk Down” have as you were writing “Thunder Run,” and have you been approached about movie rights to the story?
Mark Bowden’s Black Hawk Down had a
considerable influence on the way I approached Thunder Run. I
was Mark’s editor at The Philadelphia Inquirer for Black Hawk Down and for
Killing Pablo, the story of the hunt for Pablo Escobar. Both books began as
newspaper series in The Inquirer, and I worked closely with Mark in shaping and
editing both projects. I was impressed with the way Mark picked the brains of
scores of soldiers involved in both the battle of Mogadishu and the hunt for
Escobar. He was able to elicit not only precise details of events, but he also
delved into the state of mind of the men involved. He’s a very skilled
interviewer and an extremely talented writer. I tried to follow Mark’s example
for Thunder Run, eventually interviewing more than 100 men from the Second
Brigade, many of them for several hours at a time. Mark was extremely helpful in
reading over portions of the manuscript and offering advice.
Several movie producers have inquired about rights to the book, which will be published the second week of April.
The conventional wisdom, at least conveyed by the media, is that armor has a very limited role in urban combat, and there’s historical evidence to support that claim…for instance, the Russian experience in Grozny. But this story was nothing short of the polar opposite...armored vehicles plunging straight into the heart of a hostile city filled with millions of people. What do you attribute their success to?
As I point out in the book, the U.S. military command clung to the conventional wisdom about armor in urban combat while planning the attack on Iraq. The Pentagon is still leery of fighting in cities, in part because of the disastrous Mogadishu raid described in Black Hawk Down. In fact, the plan in Iraq was for armor to set up forward operating bases surrounding Baghdad in order to provide blocking positions for the 101st Airborne Division and the 82nd Airborne Division. The idea was to have infantry from the two airborne divisions clear the city block by block while the armor stayed on the city’s periphery. The commander of the Second Brigade, Colonel David Perkins, turned that strategy on its head. Even when Perkins raced into the city with two tank battalions on April 7th, the higher commands at V Corps, CFLCC and CENTCOM were under the impression that this was just another thunder run – a quick strike in and out of the city, to be followed by a series of thunder runs over the next couple of weeks. The intent was to use the armored strikes to gradually wear down enemy resistance as, simultaneously, the airborne infantry cleared sections of the city. But Perkins intended all along to speed into the downtown palace and governmental complex and stay there. He persuaded his superiors to let him stay late on the morning of April 7th – even before his infantry battalion was able to secure the supply lines along Highway 8. I think Perkins was successful because he blasted past the enemy’s heaviest defenses, which were along Highway 8, and penetrated the heart of the regime before the Iraqi military could react. He got inside their decision cycle and stayed a step ahead. He used speed, firepower and surprise to cut in behind enemy lines and collapse the regime from within.
Military writers like Ralph Peters suggest that much of future of war will revolve around cities. Do you think the US military has the appropriate hardware, technology, and training to do it right? In the process of writing the book, did you hear of soldiers consistently wishing for something that they didn’t have?
I’m not an expert on the military by any means, so I can’t judge whether the military has the hardware, etc. to fight in cities. I can only say that in Baghdad the 2nd Brigade of the 3rd ID turned military doctrine on its head by sending tanks and Bradleys into the heart of Baghdad, where the crews fought gunmen firing from bunkers, trenches, windows, rooftops and alleys. The brigade proved not only that tanks could fight inside cities, but that they could prevail.
The main thing soldiers told me they wished
they’d had (in addition to more spare parts for their tanks and Bradleys) was
accurate intelligence. Many commanders and officers told me during the war and
afterwards that they felt hamstrung by the lack of intelligence. They went into
the battle of Baghdad with virtually no sense of what kind of enemy they were
facing, their weapons and tactics, or their willingness to fight. One tank
company commander told me he was surprised by the extensive bunker and trench
network he encountered in the city. A couple of days after the battle, the
commander ran into a French newspaper reporter who told him that he’d written
articles weeks earlier about the bunkers and trenches. ``Guess the CIA doesn’t
subscribe to the French papers,’’ the captain told me.
War, especially modern American war in the glare of the
media, is sometimes as much a battle to win the message as it is to win the
battle. What influence did the presence of embedded reporters, and the nonstop
TV propaganda coming from the Iraqi government, have in the battle?
The media had a significant impact on the strategy of Col. Perkins, the brigade commander. He was very frustrated on April 5, after the brigade’s first thunder run into the city – the first time U.S. troops had penetrated Baghdad. The Iraqi information minister denied that U.S. forces were anywhere near Baghdad, and the BBC reported that its correspondents had not seen any American troops in the city. Perkins decided then that he was involved in an information war as well as a military war. He realized he couldn’t just put his troops and tanks in downtown Baghdad; he had to PROVE they were there. He made sure the reporters embedded with the brigade got full access to the April 7 thunder run, and he and his battalion commanders did live interviews with an embedded Fox News crew from the grounds of one of Saddam’s downtown palaces. At the same time, the information minister was again denying that American forces were in Baghdad. But this time, Perkins was able to prove that he was in the city. That had a significant impact not only on U.S. strategy, but on the willingness of Iraqi forces to continue fighting.
There has been a number of articles portraying the ground war into Iraq as a cakewalk, with tales of Iraqi forces crumbling or surrendering rather than fight. As someone who was there, is that an accurate portrayal of the war, and do you think the American public understands what happened to the soldiers facing the Iraqi Army?
I
find it ironic that a war covered by more than 600 embedded journalists produced
virtually no first-hand, up-close accounts of what it was like for American
forces to engage in combat. The news media still relied heavily on accounts
provided by official Pentagon spokesmen in Kuwait, at CENTCOM headquarters in
Doha, Qatar, and at the Pentagon. These spokesmen portrayed the battle for
Baghdad as essentially a cakewalk. But the soldiers involved in the battle
experienced three days of intense and terrifying combat inside the city and
along the main supply route on Highway 8. Though many Iraqi soldiers did indeed
throw down their weapons and flee, the Second Brigade soldiers were attacked by
thousands of Iraqi Special Republican Guards, Fedayeen, Baath Party militiamen
and Syrian, Jordanian and Palestinian mercenaries. American units fighting at
three intersections on Highway 8 were nearly overrun by fighters attacking from
trenches, rooftops and suicide vehicles. The brigade did not lose a single
soldier to enemy fire during the two-week charge from the Kuwait border to
Baghdad. But in a roughly five-hour period on April 7, the brigade had five
soldiers and two embedded reporters killed and about 40 soldiers wounded. Most
of the soldiers I interviewed from the 2nd Brigade said they had never been
interviewed about the battle, and all described the battle for Baghdad as
ferocious. Soldiers who had fought the first Gulf War said the battle was far
more intense than anything they experienced 12 years earlier.
“Thunder Run” details an event that presumably will be studied heavily in creating future doctrine for the military. Another example from the Iraq War could be the Apache raid on Karbala that resulted in the downed Longbow and captured crew. What lessons do you draw from your experience about the ability of the US military to learn from its experiences, and do you think civilians give it appropriate credit for that?
The military places heavy emphasis on after-action reports and lessons-learned reports. The Iraqi campaign is being studied now by the Army Center for Lessons Learned, by military think tanks and by academics. Hundreds of reports will be issued detailing what went wrong and what went well, and why. Whether the military learns anything from these studies and applies the lessons to training to future wars remains to be seen. I can say that Col. Perkins and his command staff learned from the brigade’s first thunder run on April 5th and applied those lessons to the April 7th attack. For instance, they realized that controlling the overpasses would be crucial, so they fired artillery and rockets at the interchanges just before the tank battalions sped through them – the only time in the war that artillery was combined with an armored assault. Perkins and his commanders also had their tank and Bradley crews remove all gear from the outside bustle racks on the 7th because so much gear caught fire and burned on the 5th. And finally, they decided not to have the armored columns stop if a tank or Bradley was disabled; the armored column on the April 5th thunder run sat exposed on Highway 8 for half an hour on the 5th while the crews tried to put out a fire on a disabled tank.
What perceptions did you have about the military prior to being embedded, and did the embedding process change your views in any way?
I grew up in the military as the son of a career
first sergeant, so I am well acquainted with the military culture and am
comfortable around the military. I have covered the U.S. military as a reporter
since the bombing of the U.S. Marine barracks in Beirut in 1982. I was embedded
twice in Afghanistan with the 82nd Airborne, covering attacks against Al Qaeda
and Taliban holdouts along the Afghan-Pakistan border, and once with a Special
Forces ``A’’ Team hunting down Al Qaeda and Taliban fighters on a three-week
mission through the mountains of western Afghanistan. I have seen a gradual
shift over the years from suspicion and hostility by members of the military
towards the press to a new sense that the media can be used to tell the
military’s story. The embedding process had many limitations – a lack of
perspective; the utter reliance on the military for access, food, and
transportation; the danger of getting too close to the people being covered; and
the expectation by some commanders that reporters should be cheerleaders for
their units and avoid controversial subjects. But the access provided to
reporters was unprecedented and allowed us to witness events rather than rely on
the accounts of military spokesmen. I reported on subjects that made the
military uncomfortable – civilian casualties, looting, friendly fire and the
theft of cash by U.S. soldiers – but I was also able to report first-hand on
the way the military fought the war and what it was like for individual soldiers
and commanders to carry out U.S. strategy in Iraq. Overall, I think the
embedding process benefited the military, the media and the American public.
Yours is probably the third or fourth major title to come out about the Iraq War by embedded reporters. Tell us a little about your feelings on the embedding process. What were the challenges or advantages as a reporter?
The
main challenge was to maintain a sense of perspective. I saw only a tiny corner
of the overall war – whatever happened to play out in front of me on a
particular day. I had no idea what was going on elsewhere, particularly because
I had lost my two satellite phones and laptop when the troop truck I was on
plunged into a canal near Karbala. If The Los Angeles Times had to rely on me
alone to cover the war, the paper would have been in deep trouble. I provided
only a fraction of the overall coverage. Our paper had three other embedded
journalists and three more ``unilateral’’ journalists reporting on their own
in southern Iraq. The LA Times also had three journalists reporting from
Baghdad, plus others reporting from northern Iraq, Arab capitals, the Pentagon,
and from CENTCOM headquarters in Qatar and CFLC headquarters in Kuwait City. We
also had a two-person editing team posted in Doha. With all these reporters and
photographers and editors contributing, the paper’s coverage was detailed,
invigorated and comprehensive. I’m biased, but I think The LA Times’
coverage was superior to any other newspaper. The advantage of the embedding
process was that it provided our reporters with a first-hand view of the war on
the ground. Even with all its limitations, the process allowed us to attend
intelligence briefings, to interview commanders before and after firefights, and
to be on the scene during combat operations.
Was there any one moment or incident that you wished to have included in the book but didn’t? What was it and why didn’t it make it in?
I think I managed to cover all the major incidents and events involving the 2nd Brigade and its battle for Baghdad.
Assuming an ability to get the information, what other story of the Iraq War would you like to have written if given the choice? Why?
I would loved to have been ``embedded’’ with Iraqi forces in order to get a better understanding of their tactics, expectations and performance. I interviewed several Republican Guard generals and Iraqi officers after the war to get an idea of what happened on the other side of the war, but a first-hand experience would have been invaluable.
What did the Iraqis say?
[Note: Zucchino answered this question by sharing an August 2003 article he had written for the Los Angeles Times, portions of which are presented below]
Iraqi forces, who did not anticipate Americans would use tanks in urban combat inside the capital city, were largely unprepared for the ensuing armored onslaught. Hussein, convinced that Republican Guard units posted south of Baghdad would repel American tanks, had decided not to mine highways or blow up bridges leading into the capital, commanders said. The infrastructure was left intact so that it could be used by Iraqi forces mounting counterattacks. But entire Republican Guard divisions were ravaged, first by coalition warplanes and then by tanks approaching the capital.
"We should have mined the roads and bridges. We should have planned a guerrilla war," said retired Gen. Ahmed Rahal, 51. "We were crippled by a lack of imagination."
Iraqi military planners assumed that Americans would dare not send tanks into an urban area and did not anticipate a direct tank assault on the capital, retired Gen. Rahal said.
Several commanders said that American casualties inflicted by Somali fighters in 1993 convinced the Iraqi leadership that U.S. forces had no stomach for a prolonged urban fight — apparently overlooking the fact that the U.S. had no armor in Somalia. The Iraqi leadership prepared instead for an airborne assault on selected regime targets, building a network of defensive bunkers and trenches.
"We weren't prepared, but it didn't matter because the tank assault was so fast and sudden," said Gen. Omar Abdul Karim, 50, a regular army commander. "The Americans were able to divide and isolate our forces. Nobody had any idea what was going on until it was too late."At times in early April, elite units went to great lengths to project a facade of invincibility — even as they were going down in defeat. After U.S. tanks smashed through southwest Baghdad on April 5, killing nearly 1,000 Iraqi soldiers according to U.S. commanders, Fedayeen militiamen claimed victory and celebrated downtown. They displayed charred corpses they claimed were bodies of U.S. soldiers, [Republican Guard Col. Raaed] Faik said.
"I looked closer and saw they were Republican Guards, still in their uniforms with insignia," Faik said. "I spent 12 years in the Republican Guards. I know the difference between a Republican Guard soldier and an American soldier. I was appalled."
When he returned to headquarters an hour northeast of the capital and told fellow commanders that American tanks had penetrated Baghdad, Faik said, they called him a liar. But the truth was becoming inescapable. By April 7, according to two former soldiers, Saddam and Qusai Hussein had been reduced to commanding the military from a roving convoy of vehicles trying to stay one step ahead of American tanks pouring into the city center that morning.
Others were deluded by the regime's own propaganda. Many commanders said they actually believed Hussein's hapless minister of information, Mohammed Said Sahaf, who brazenly denied that U.S. forces had entered Baghdad on April 7 and described the slaughter of Americans.
Talal Ahmed Doori, 32, a burly Baath Party militia commander and former bodyguard for Hussein's older son, Uday, recalled turning a corner in his car early April 7 and coming face to face with an American M1A1 Abrams tank posted next to a tunnel in central Baghdad.
"I was absolutely astonished," Doori recalled. "I had no idea there were American tanks anywhere near the city."
After the information minister claimed that Iraqi forces had retaken the Baghdad airport from U.S. troops, two former commanders said, Republican Guard Gen. Mohammed Daash was dispatched to check out a rumor that four or five American tanks had survived the Iraqi counterattack.
Daash returned to his headquarters in a panic. "Four or five tanks!" the commanders quoted Daash as telling his fellow generals. "Are you out of your minds? The whole damn American Army is at the airport!"
What has been the reaction of the soldiers featured in the book? Have they read it yet?
The officers and soldiers whose stories are told
in the book have thanked me for interviewing them and for taking the time to try
to provide a detailed and accurate account of the battle for Baghdad. They were
exceptionally candid with me, revealing theirs fears and shortcomings as well as
their minute-by-minute experiences in combat. They have told me that they
consider the book fair, accurate and comprehensive.
Please describe the interviewing process and research you put into the title.
I interviewed commanders, officers and soldiers from the 2nd Brigade during the battle for Baghdad and in the weeks after the war. After spending almost three months with six different military units (including the 2nd Brigade), I returned to the U.S. in May, 2003. I went back to Iraq that July and August, and interviewed more men from the brigade at their post in Falloujah. Later that year I made two trips to Ft. Stewart to continue the interviews after the brigade returned from Iraq. Most interviews lasted between one and two hours. I had soldiers go over their combat roles minute by minute. I was surprised by how detailed their accounts were, and by their willingness to share their thoughts and emotions. Many soldiers were interviewed several times. When soldiers’ accounts conflicted, I re-interviewed those involved to reconcile the differences. I also read through the combat histories of the units involved in the battle, and relied on personal journals, after-action reports and photos and videos taken by soldiers during the battle.
What’s next?
I’ve returned to my real job as a national
correspondent for The Los Angeles Times. In fact, Thunder Run began as a long
article published in the paper’s Sunday magazine last December.
Map of southwest corner of Baghdad, showing
cloverleafs,
Baghdad International Airport, and the center of the city
(Hyperlink Opens in New Window)
Photo credits: David Zucchino: Rick Loomis -
Los Angeles Times, Soldiers: Dennis Steele - Army Magazine, Grenade Launcher:
Dennis Steele - Army Magazine, Thunder Run into Baghdad: Brant Sanderlin -
Atlanta Journal-Constitution, Soldiers with flag: Brant Sanderlin - Atlanta
Journal-Constitution, Cropped map of Baghdad: The Perry-Castañeda
Library Map Collection at the University of Texas
Buy
"Thunder
Run: The Armored Strike to Capture Baghdad"
at Amazon.com
All of my 'Amazon.com Associates' proceeds*
from the sale of this book on this site will go to the
'3rd ID Fallen Soldier Fund,' a collection to benefit the more than two-dozen
children who lost a parent
from the 3rd Infantry Division (Mechanized) during Operation Iraqi Freedom.
It is an education fund for them.
General donations can be made to:
3ID Fallen Soldier Fund
Attn: Susan Wilder
Army Community Services
Building 470, 76 Lindquist Rd.
Fort Stewart, GA 31314
(web
site for Ft. Stewart Army Community Services)
* Generally, 5% of the sale price
RELATED LINKS
Official page: 3rd Infantry Division (Mechanized)
StrategyPage: The Battle of Baghdad
Army Magazine: Baghdad: The Crossroads
Telegraph: The 10-Hour Battle for Curly, Larry, and Moe
PBS Frontline: The Invasion of Iraq - Interview with Col. David Perkins
Washington Post: 3 Key Battles Turned Tide of Invasion